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LIBERALIZATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PERFORMANCE
OF NEWLY PRIVATIZED FIRMS
ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question, namely  when and how does
privatization work? Using a unique sample of 201 firms headquartered in 32 developing
countries, we document a significant increase in profitability, efficiency, investment and output.
Next, using univariate tests, we show that corporate governance mechanisms and economic
reforms and environment have an effect on the changes in operating performance.  For
example, we find that privatization yields better results when stock market and trade
liberalizations precede it.  The results of a regression analysis, across a number of specifications,
indicate that economic reforms and environment as well as corporate governance variables
explain the post-privatization performance changes.  In particular, economic growth, control
relinquishment by the government and foreign ownership are key determinants of profitability
changes.  We also find higher improvements in efficiency and output for firms in countries in
which stock markets are more developed and where property rights are better protected and
enforced.  Finally, our results suggest that trade openness is an important determinant of the
post-privatization increase in investment.    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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LIBERALIZATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PERFORMANCE
OF NEWLY PRIVATIZED FIRMS
Several studies have recently documented a performance improvement of newly privatized
firms in developed and developing countries (e.g., Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh,
1994; Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Dewenter and Malatesta,
2001).1  Although these studies have shown that the outcomes of privatization tend to vary with
the level of country development, none has examined the determinants of performance changes
of newly privatized firms in developing countries.  In this paper, we seek to provide an answer
to the following question, namely when and how does privatization work? This question is
timely because many developing countries only began to undertake large scale privatizations
in the 1990s (Ramamurti, 1999). The results of this study should, therefore, be of interest to
investors, government policy makers as well as officials of international agencies, such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, by providing insights on the way
privatization works.
This paper makes two main contributions. The first contribution is to assess the
performance outcomes of privatization for a unique sample of newly privatized firms from a
wide set of developing countries.  Our analysis covers a large sample of 201 firms from 32
developing countries over the period 1980 to 1997.  In doing so, we go beyond Boubakri and
Cosset (1998) who consider a sample of 79 firms from 21 countries over the period (1980 to
1992).  The data set we use represents the shift of privatization towards new industries (e.g.,
utilities and telecommunication) and new participating countries (such as African countries).
Furthermore, this multi-national sample includes a large number of countries with different
levels of economic and institutional development, at different stages of economic reforms and
                                                
1 See Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2001) for thorough reviews of the empirical literature
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with a great variety of legal systems, providing us with a unique opportunity to assess the role
of these country-wide factors in the performance of newly privatized firms.
The second contribution of the paper is to examine the determinants of performance
changes of newly privatized firms by focusing on the specific environment of developing
countries.  We conjecture that, in order to explain how privatization works in such an
environment, we need to account for (i) the ongoing economic reforms in developing countries,
such as stock market and trade liberalization policies, as well as  (ii) corporate governance, all of
which could affect the outcome of privatization.  The first set of factors is particularly important
as it fundamentally distinguishes privatization in developing countries from that in developed
countries since privatization in developing countries is generally implemented as part of a
broader program of structural adjustment involving other concomitant economic reforms.   For
example, stock market and trade liberalizations could create stronger competition and higher
growth rates likely to spur performance improvements.  The second set of factors relates to the
recent literature on the importance of a country’s level of corporate governance and
institutional development.  Moreover, this constitutes a major difference between developed
and developing countries, since the governance mechanisms are relatively weaker in the latter.
Indeed, several authors recently emphasized the importance of a country's level of institutional
development as a determinant of the failure or success of privatization programs (e.g.,
Ramamurti, 2000; Dyck, 2001; Shirley, 2001).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the modest
gains of privatization in some developing countries are partly due to their lack of an
institutional framework for efficient corporate governance.  In this paper, we shall provide
empirical support for these contentions and contribute to the existing literature by accounting
for the features of developing countries in our assessment of the performance of newly
privatized firms.  In fact, this study unites in a single framework two streams of literature in
development and financial economics: the first deals with the impact of economic reforms on
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the country- and firm-level performance (e.g., Dornbusch, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995;
Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000; Tybout, 2000; Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2001a,b);
the second, the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, including the ownership structure
and property rights, on the country- and firm-level performance (e.g., La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998;
Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, 2000; Mitton, 2001).2
Using a unique sample of 201 newly privatized firms, we first document a significant
increase in both unadjusted and market-adjusted profitability, efficiency, investment and
output.  Next, partitioning our data into various subsamples, we show that the changes in
operating performance vary with the extent of economic reforms and environment, and the
effectiveness of corporate governance.  For example, we demonstrate that privatization yields
better results if it is preceded by trade and stock market liberalizations.  Finally, performing a
multivariate regression analysis, we find that economic reforms and environment as well as
corporate governance variables explain post-privatization performance changes.  In particular,
we document that economic growth and stock market liberalization are associated with
stronger profitability and efficiency gains and greater output increases.  Moreover, our results
suggest that trade openness and economic freedom are important determinants of the post-
privatization increase in efficiency and output.  Trade openness also appears to be associated
with higher levels of post-privatization investment.  In relation with corporate governance
variables, we provide evidence that control relinquishment by the government is a key
determinant of profitability and efficiency improvements as well as output increases following
privatization.  Furthermore, we find that foreign ownership is associated with stronger
profitability gains. We likewise find that higher gains in efficiency and output occur for firms in
countries with more developed stock markets and where property rights are better protected
                                                
2 A recent study by D’Souza, Megginson and Nash (2001) examines the determinants of performance
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and enforced.  These results are robust across various specifications.  Taken together, our
findings highlight the importance of corporate governance and economic reforms and
environment in explaining the post-privatization changes in performance. Correspondingly,
our findings have several policy implications for the different stakeholders involved in the
privatization process.
The paper is organized as follows: the first section discusses the links between economic
reforms, corporate governance and privatization. Section II describes the sample and data and
outlines the methodology.  Section III presents the results, while Section IV concludes and
provides some policy implications.
I. Economic Reforms, Corporate Governance and Privatization
A. Privatization and Economic Reforms
Privatization in developing countries (DCs hereafter) is often accompanied by economic
reforms such as stock market and trade liberalization that could influence the outcomes of a
privatization program.  Several authors have studied the effect of economic and financial
reforms on the economies of DCs.  For example, Henry (2000) examines the impact of stock
market liberalization on the returns of twelve emerging stock markets.  Controlling for
macroeconomic fundamentals, co-movements with foreign stock markets and concurrent
economic reforms (such as macroeconomic stabilization programs, trade liberalization,
privatization and the easing of exchange controls), Henry finds a monthly mean abnormal
return of 3.3 percent over an eight-month period leading up to the implementation of the stock
market liberalization.  The author also documents that privatization has a positive effect on
stock returns.  However, once he controls for the specific economic conditions of the country,
the impact of privatization is no longer significant.  Henry argues that one possible explanation
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for this result is that governments tend to privatize when the economic conditions are favorable.
In related studies, Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001a,b)
analyze the impact of stock market liberalization in emerging markets on, among other things,
the cost of equity capital (expected equity returns) and economic growth.  Controlling for a
number of other factors (such as the level of stock market development, the size of the trade
sector and the macroeconomic environment) to isolate the sole impact of liberalization, they
find that stock market liberalization is associated with lower costs of equity capital and higher
economic growth rates.  In light of these findings, we expect a positive association between
privatization outcomes and stock market liberalization.
Similarly, Dornbusch (1992) focuses on trade liberalization.  He identifies several
channels through which trade reforms could bring benefits.  Examples include an improved
allocation of resources, greater competition and an access to better technologies, inputs and
intermediate goods.  Thus, irrespective of privatization, trade liberalization could bring changes
in the performance of newly privatized firms (NPFs hereafter).3  Empirically, Henry (2000)
shows that trade liberalization is associated with equity price revaluation, a result consistent
with Sachs and Warner’s (1995) evidence that this policy is closely tied to future growth.
The above evidence suggests that stock market and trade liberalization creates favorable
economic conditions (e.g., stronger competition and higher growth rates) likely to spur
performance improvements.  Consequently, we need to account for the possible confounding
effects of such economic reforms on the performance of newly privatized firms.
B. Privatization and Corporate Governance
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Dyck (2000), among others, argue that corporate governance can
explain the performance of privatized firms.  In developed countries, the governance system isWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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relatively efficient in that investors are confident to obtain returns on their investments and
firms can raise the necessary funds to finance their investment projects.  In contrast, the
governance mechanisms in DCs are generally weak and the risk of expropriation of
shareholders by managers or by blockholders is considerable.  This limits the financing
opportunities for firms that need to invest or restructure, especially NPFs, since a direct
consequence of privatization is usually a reduction (if not an elimination) of government
subsidies.  This, in turn, could affect post-privatization performance.
The literature generally distinguishes two types of corporate governance mechanisms,
that is internal and external.  Internal mechanisms include the ownership structure and the
organizational structure of the firm, while external mechanisms include the monitoring of
capital markets and the legal and institutional system.
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) develop a model of privatization that explains the
relative inefficiency of public firms and the improvements of post-privatization efficiency.
Specifically, they present a model in which privatization transfers both control and cash flow
rights to the managers who then place greater emphasis on profits and efficiency.
Consequently, we expect the gains in performance to be higher when the government gives up
control.  In the same vein, the growing involvement of foreign investors could affect the post-
privatization performance of NPFs.  Foreign investors generally require high information
disclosure standards, provide new funds to NPFs and, for reputation concerns, maintain a strict
control of managers’ actions (Dyck, 2000, Shirley, 2001).  Therefore, we expect a positive
association between post-privatization performance improvements and foreign ownership.
The other internal monitoring mechanisms that relate to the organizational structure of
the firm are the Board of Directors (BOD hereafter) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO hereafter).
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In the privatization literature, one reason often put forward to explain the poor performance of
state-owned enterprises is the low qualification of government-appointed-BOD members and
managers (López-de-Silanes, 1997).  Furthermore, incentives to monitor managerial behavior
are poor, leaving managers considerable discretion to pursue their personal agendas (Vickers
and Yarrow, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Indeed, as noted by Özkaya and Askari (1999),
old fashioned compensation schemes, based on tenure and not performance, prevail in the
majority of DCs.  Changes in the membership of the BOD as well as changes of the CEO can be
put in place to ascertain more effective monitoring and management, respectively.  The under-
qualified managers could be replaced by others whose objectives are more aligned with profit
maximization, and new monitoring mechanisms could be put in place by the new
shareholders.4 Therefore, we expect that restructuring the BOD and changing the CEO can
affect the post-privatization performance.
As mentioned earlier, there also exist external mechanisms of corporate governance
which include capital market monitoring and the legal system.  The monitoring role of the
market depends on the size and the sophistication of the local capital market (Subrahmanyam
and Titman, 1999; Levine, 1997; Levine and Zervos, 1998).  A large and sophisticated market
implies (i) a “friendlier” market-and-regulatory environment, (ii) better access to the funds
necessary to restructure the NPFs, and (iii) better monitoring and performance linked-
compensation for managers.  Therefore, we expect the NPFs in relatively more sophisticated
and larger stock markets to perform better.
Law and the quality of its enforcement are likely to influence the monitoring role played
by the market.  La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) show that the legal
protection of shareholder rights varies around the world.  Specifically, countries with an
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English common law system offer stronger rights to shareholders and higher quality of law
enforcement than do countries with a French civil law system do.  In the same vein, Pagano and
Roell (1998) argue that a market with a stronger protection of shareholder rights decreases the
costs of agency and increases the efficiency of monitoring managers.  Consequently, we expect
post-privatization performance to be higher for countries where laws protect shareholder rights
and which have a legal system that efficiently enforces these laws.
II. Data and Methodology
This section describes the sample of NPFs and outlines the methodology we use in our analysis.
A. The Sample of Privatized Firms
The initial sample of NPFs comes from Boubakri and Cosset (1998).  It was updated with the
World Bank list of firms privatized between 1990 and 1998.5  Our sample does not include
privatized companies in the ex-communist countries since the process of privatization in this
context is an intrinsic part  of the transformation to a market-based system (Galal, Jones,
Tandon and Vogelsang, 1994; Özkaya and Askari, 1999).  Furthermore, the traditional law
system in these countries is based on the Soviet law which underwent many changes during
their  transition period (La Porta, Lòpez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000).
To assess the post-privatization performance changes, we draw the financial information
from the NPFs’ financial statements, their web site, and from databases such as Worldscope
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Disclosure, Compustat (Global Vantage), Moody's International and Economatica.  Using these
different sources, we gather data for a sample of 201 firms headquartered in 32 countries.  Table
1 provides some descriptive statistics on the 201 firms used in the study.  The 201 firms are
located in the following  four geographical regions. Latin America and the Caribbean account
for 33.33 percent of the firms, 24.38 percent come from Africa and the Middle East, 24.88 percent
from East and South Asia and the Pacific and 17.41 percent from Europe and Central Asia.
Interestingly, this diversification involves countries with different levels of development and
different legal and institutional environments.  Table 1 also shows that the sample is diversified
across industries with 32.84 percent in the financial sector, 26.87 percent in the energy sector
and 10.95 percent in utilities.  Furthermore, 78 percent of the privatizations have occurred in the
nineties, which reflects the recent trend towards large scale privatizations by DCs.  Finally, the
sample of NPFs covers three legal systems: 32.34 percent of the firms come from common law
countries, 65.17 percent from French civil law countries and 2.49 percent from German civil law
countries.
B. Methodology
In order to examine the impact of privatization on the operating performance of NPFs and to
investigate the determinants of the changes in performance, we proceed with univariate and
multivariate analyses.  We first present the different partitions we analyze. Then, we describe
the variables we include in the multivariate regression.
B.1 Univariate Analysis
We rely on four aspects of firm performance:
Profitability: We measure profitability by the return on sales (net income to sales), return on
assets (net income to total assets) and return on equity (net income to equity) ratios.
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Efficiency: We measure operating efficiency by the sales efficiency (real sales per employee) and
net income efficiency (net income per employee) ratios.
Investment: We measure investment by capital expenditures to sales and capital expenditures to
total assets.
Output: We measure output by real sales (nominal sales divided by the consumer price index).
The use of different performance measures allows us to draw up a more comprehensive
assessment of the impact of privatization on the performance of the former state-owned
enterprises.  In particular, examining the first two groups of ratios reveals whether privatization
helps to improve the profitability and the efficiency of the firm which are two of the main goals
advanced by governments to advocate privatization.
We determine the performance measures presented above for a period of seven years
(three years prior to privatization and three years post privatization, including the year of
privatization itself).  We then compute the means before and after privatization for each
performance measure.  We consider as the privatization date to be the date on which the
government sold, for the first time, a certain amount of shares. We pay particular attention to
the exact date of privatization by checking different sources of information, namely, the World
Bank Privatization Database, Privatization International, the prospectuses and the answers to the
questionnaires we sent to the candidate firms. To assess the significance of performance
changes, we use the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  We also use a proportion test that
determines whether the proportion of firms with the anticipated changes is greater than 50
percent.
In order to investigate whether the changes in performance vary with the extent of
economic reforms and environment and the effectiveness of corporate governance, we analyze
the differences in performance between two groups of partitions.  The first group includes
partitions with respect to the extent of economic reforms and environment:William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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(i) Firms privatized before trade (stock market) liberalization versus those privatized after trade
(stock market) liberalization.  We gather trade liberalization dates from Sachs and Warner
(1995) and stock market liberalization dates from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2000a), and
Henry (2000).
(ii) Firms privatized in countries with a high index of economic freedom (i.e., friendlier
environment) and those privatized in countries with a lower index of economic freedom (more
restrictive environment).6  The rationale underlying the use of this comprehensive index,
constructed by Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000), is that countries with less economic
freedom are characterized by a greater government intervention and a higher policy
uncertainty, which may lead to economic inefficiency.
The second group of partitions analyzes the role of corporate governance in explaining
the differences in the performance of NPFs:
(i) Revenue versus control privatization, that is, firms privatized by less than or equal to 50
percent versus firms privatized by more than 50 percent (Megginson, Nash and van
Randenborgh, 1994).
(ii) Firms with foreign ownership versus firms with no foreign ownership.
(iii) Firms that change their CEO versus firms that do not change their CEO over the
privatization window.7
                                                
6 This index, described below in Table 3a, is a range of objective components designed to identify how
policies in key economic areas are consistent with economic freedom.  This index ranges from 0 to 10, with
higher scores indicating higher levels of economic freedom.
7 We also contrast firms with a high-BOD-turnover versus firms with a low-BOD-turnover. Variables
related to ownership structure, BOD and CEO are compiled from the prospectuses, the financial
statements, and such publications as Worldscope Disclosure, Moody's International, Asian, Brazil and Mexico
Company Handbooks, and The Guide to Asian Companies.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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(iv) Firms in stronger legal and institutional environments versus firms privatized in weaker
legal and institutional environments.  We use a governance index by Gwartney, Lawson and
Samida (2000) as a measure of the legal structure and security of property rights and the
enforcement of contracts.  Higher values of the index indicate more effective governance.
B.2 Multivariate Analysis
While the results of the univariate approach can offer some insight, they only document
bivariate relationships and they do not control for the effect of other variables. Hence, we
perform a multivariate analysis in which we regress the changes in performance indicators (i.e.,
profitability, efficiency, investment and output) on several potential explanatory variables,
namely, economic reforms and environment and corporate governance variables.  We  also
control for firm size and industry effects.  Table 2 describes all the variables used in the
regression analysis.
For each performance measure, we estimate different specifications of the following
cross-sectional regression:
Performance Changes = α 0+ β 1(Economic Reforms and Environment Variables)
+ β 2 (Corporate Governance Variables) + β 3  (Firm Size)  + β 4 (Industry Dummies)  + ε
In addition to the variables described in sub-section B.1, we include such variables as the
changes in the real GDP growth and the size of the trade sector (imports plus exports) divided
by GDP.  The use of real GDP growth allows us to control for the impact of  economic growth
on the post-privatization performance of NPFs.  The size of the trade sector, motivated by
Bekaert and Harvey (2000), is a proxy for an economy's openness to trade.  As an alternative to
the governance index, we use an indicator variable for NPFs operating in common law
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countries since these countries generally exhibit a higher protection of investors than do civil
law countries (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
C. Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3a, we classify our sample of 32 countries according to the country’s legal origin and
present summary statistics on the macroeconomic variables (Panel A) and corporate governance
variables (Panel B).  With few exceptions, most of the stock market liberalizations occurred at
the end of the eighties and during the nineties.  Except for Argentina, India and Pakistan, trade
liberalization precedes stock market liberalization.  Consistent with the observations of La
Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) for a smaller subsample of DCs, Panel
B shows that countries with an English or German legal origin exhibit higher levels of stock
market development and legal protections as well as a more favorable institutional
environment than countries with a French civil law origin.
Figure 1 describes the mean level of the economic freedom index over the period 1980-
1997 for the 32 countries classified into four geographical regions.  The East and South Asian
and the Pacific region exhibits the highest level of economic freedom (6.30), followed by Europe
and Central Asia (6.03), Latin America and the Caribbean (5.77) and Africa and the Middle East
(5.04).  The relatively higher mean levels of economic freedom shown by the first two groups of
countries reflect the fact that these countries implemented substantial economic reforms (trade
and stock market liberalization) relatively earlier than the other groups.  With the exception of
Bangladesh, all countries from the East and South Asian and Pacific region and the European
and Central Asian region implemented trade and/or stock market liberalization by the end of
the 1980s to early 1990s.  Except for Trinidad and Tobago, Latin American and the Caribbean
economies were liberalized by the early 1990s either through trade or stock market
liberalization.  The case of the African and Middle Eastern region is different since economic
reforms started mainly in the early 1990s with the adoption of IMF-supported structuralWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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adjustment programs.  Although considerable progress has been made in this region, many
countries had not yet implemented trade liberalization (Côte D’Ivoire, Egypt, Senegal and
Togo) and stock market liberalization (Côte D’Ivoire, Togo and Tunisia) by 1997.  Thus, a recent
IMF study developed an index of trade restrictiveness to facilitate cross-country comparisons
and track the evolution of trade policy over time.  Figure 2 reports the 1997 value of the index
for the four regions.  Countries from the African and the Middle Eastern region exhibit the
highest scores suggesting that their trade regimes are the most restrictive ones.  Tariffs – the
most commonly used form of trade restrictiveness – were 20 percent higher in Africa than
elsewhere in 1997.8   Figure 3 reports the average scores of the governance index, described in
Panel B of Table 3, for the four geographical regions.  The average scores over the period 1980-
97 differ widely across regions.  The European and Central Asian region exhibits the highest
average score (7.02), followed by East and South Asia and the Pacific (6.34) and Latin America
and the Caribbean (5.87).  As in Figure 1, countries from Africa and the Middle East show the
lowest average score (4.69).  Figure 4 depicts the level of stock market development measured
by the average turnover ratio over the period 1980-97. The average turnover ratio differs
substantially across the four regions with countries from Africa and the Middle East displaying
the lowest ratio.  This observation is consistent with the basic prediction of the legal approach of
corporate governance suggesting that the quality of laws and the effectiveness of their
enforcement are key determinants of stock market development (see La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000, and references therein).
Table 3b presents some descriptive statistics on the post-privatization ownership
structure and size (proxied by the natural logarithm of total dollar sales at the time of
privatization) for the sample of NPFs.  The mean (median) post-privatization government
ownership is 32.49 (30) percent in English common law countries and 24.52 (5) percent in
countries of other legal origins.  Moreover, post-privatization government retained ownership
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is higher in Asian countries than in African, Latin American and European countries.  This is
consistent with Ramamurti’ s (1999) observation that the overwhelming pattern in Latin
America has been to privatize control, not just ownership, while the more common pattern
observed in East Asia was to privatize partially.  Interestingly, the distribution of post-
privatization government ownership by industry shows higher remaining stakes for strategic
industries (utilities and telecommunication).  As for the post-privatization foreign ownership,
its mean (median) is 14.09 (6) percent for English common law countries and 18.29 (4.4) percent
in other legal origin countries.
The descriptive statistics on the size of NPFs reveal some interesting patterns.  Privatized
firms from Africa and the Middle East are substantially smaller than those from the three other
regions.  The average (median) size of firms from this region is 10 (10.12), whereas it is 12.83
(12.99) for firms from  the East and South Asian and Pacific region, 12.74 (12.95) for firms from
Latin America and the Caribbean and 11.57 (12.28) for those from Europe and Central Asia.
This observation is consistent with the fact that privatization programs in Africa and the Middle
East mainly emphasized small and medium-sized firms.  Additionally, privatization programs
in this region did not involve strategic, large firms from utilities and telecommunication until
very recently.  As shown in Table 3, utilities and telecommunication firms are larger than firms
from other industries.  In industrialized countries, infrastructure was the leading sector in
privatization, largely due to the divestiture of telecommunication in the United Kingdom, Japan
and Germany.  In DCs, most infrastructure privatizations took place in Latin America and the
Caribbean.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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III. Results
In section A, we discuss the performance changes for our sample of 201 NPFs.  We then discuss
the univariate results for different partitions in section B, and the regression results in section C.
A. Univariate Analysis for the Full Sample of NPFs
A.1 Raw Performance Measures
Table 4 reports raw changes in the performance measures of our sample.   All three profitability
ratios, that is return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) increase
significantly after privatization.  In discussing the results, we choose to focus on the first proxy
(ROS) because it is less sensitive to inflation and accounting conventions than the two other
profitability ratios.  The mean (median) ROS increases significantly (at the 1 percent level) from
0.073 (0.049) before privatization to 0.149 (0.090) after privatization.  An improvement in
profitability is achieved by 61 percent of the sample firms. ROA and ROE also improve
significantly at the 1 percent level.  These results clearly show that NPFs in DCs significantly
increase their profitability.
The two proxies for efficiency, namely sales efficiency (real sales per employee
(SALEFF)) and net income efficiency (net income per employee (NIEFF)), show a significant
improvement (at the 1  percent level) in both measures for 74 percent and 65 percent of the
firms, respectively.  For example, SALEFF increases from 0.967 (0.932) of year 0 before
privatization to 1.319 (1.115) of year 0 after privatization.  These results suggest that NPFs
significantly improve their efficiency, an objective  which governments launching privatization
programs often invoke.
Both measures of investment, specifically, capital expenditures to sales (CESA) and
capital expenditures to total assets (CETA), show a significant increase at the 1 percent level, for
72 percent and 68 percent of the firms, respectively.  This result, combined with the aboveWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
18
evidence on efficiency, suggests that NPFs increase their investment expenses and improve
their efficiency in order to compete with their private counterparts (Megginson, Nash and van
Randenborgh, 1994).   
Table 4 also shows a significant increase (at the 1  percent level) in real sales (SAL).
Output is increased by 72 percent of the firms, from 1.147 (0.939) before privatization to 1.294
(1.128) after privatization.  This result goes against the often advanced argument that SOEs tend
to overproduce to satisfy political objectives (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996).  One possible
explanation for the increase in output lies in the availability of better incentives and more
flexible financing opportunities following privatization (Megginson, Nash and van
Randenborgh, 1994). Furthermore, Table 3 shows an insignificant decrease of 116 employees on
average after privatization.  This result is consistent with that of D’Souza and Megginson (1999)
who find an insignificant decline in employment for a sample of firms privatized during the
1990s.  This is in contrast to the results of La Porta and Lòpez-de-Silanes (1999) who find a
significant decline in the number of employees for their sample of Mexican NPFs.
Overall, the experience of our sample shows that privatization led to a significant
increase in the operating performance of NPFs, as measured by profitability, efficiency, output
and investment.
A.2 Market-Adjusted Performance Measures: Does Privatization Work?
A difficulty in isolating the impact of privatization on the performance of firms, particularly in
DCs, lies in the fact that the observed changes may be due to contemporaneous economy-wide
factors such as ongoing economic reforms.  Consequently, to check the robustness of our
previous unadjusted results, we perform tests with market-adjusted performance measures.
Using a large control sample of non-privatized firms, we compute market-adjusted
performance measures as the difference between the median market performance and the firm’sWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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performance, for a given performance indicator. However, as firms from the financial and real
sectors exhibit different operating and financial profiles, we use a financial-market index to
compute market-adjusted performance measures for banks and insurance companies. For other
firms, the market index consists of non-financial corporations.  Table 5 presents, for the sample
of firms for which we could compute market-adjusted performance measures, both unadjusted
and adjusted results.  In the years preceding privatization, the SOEs underperform the market
since the average market-adjusted profitability and efficiency ratios are negative.  This result
suggests that privatized firms are profitable (according to their  raw performance before
privatization) but that these firms still underperform compared to their private counterparts.
Additionally, the results reveal that privatization yields significant improvements in the
adjusted performance measures.  The unadjusted and adjusted profitability, efficiency and
output ratios show a significant improvement (at the 1  percent level).  As for investment, the
unadjusted and adjusted ratios show a significant increase at the 5 percent and 10 percent,
respectively.  Nevertheless, according to the proportion tests, the percentage of firms that
behaved as predicted is larger when we use unadjusted performance measures for the
efficiency, investment and output suggesting that some of the performance changes for NPFs
could be due to changes in economic conditions.  To summarize, even after controlling for
contemporaneous economy-wide factors, privatization still yields performance improvements.
The next section examines whether privatization yields the same results in all regions.
A.3 Cross-Regional Analysis of Performance Changes
The descriptive statistics presented in sub-section II-C suggest that variables related to
economic reforms and conditions and to corporate governance differ widely across the four
geographic regions in our sample.  If the changes in performance of NPFs vary with the extent
of economic reforms and corporate governance mechanisms, then one would expect the
privatization outcome to differ across regions with different stages of economic and
institutional development.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 6 reports the changes in performance for the sample of 201 privatized firms
classified within four geographical regions.  The multi-sample nonparametric Savage test rejects
(at the 5 percent level) the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the profitability (ROS),
efficiency (SALEFF) and output (SAL) changes across the four regions.  Post-privatization
improvements in profitability are significant for East and South Asia and the Pacific and for
Latin America and the Caribbean.  Except for Africa and the Middle East, the regions exhibit
significant increases in efficiency and output.  As discussed above (sub-section II-C), the limited
level of economic freedom, the lack of developed stock markets and the low quality of laws and
their enforcement in the countries of this region could explain why profitability, efficiency and
output do not improve much for Africa and the Middle East.  Finally, post-privatization
changes in investment are significant at the 1 percent level for the African and Middle Eastern
region, at the 5 percent level for the Latin American and Caribbean region and at the 10 percent
level for the East and South Asian and Pacific region. The importance of foreign investors
involved in the privatization process in Africa and Latin America  ( an average of 19.86 and
26.12 percent, respectively), as compared to other regions (an average of 9.95 and 7.20 percent),
could explain these results. Indeed, foreign investors are generally perceived as a source of
capital and managerial know-how. Similarly, government ownership after privatization is
much lower  in Africa and Latin America (an average of 21.14 and 13.27 percent, respectively)
where control privatizations dominate, thus providing new owners with the necessary
incentives to restructure and invest.
Overall, the results from Table 6 show that performance gains from privatization vary
widely across regions.  This further motivates the need to explore the determinants of post-
privatization performance changes, particularly those related to economic reforms and
conditions and corporate governance variables.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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B. Univariate Analysis of Different Subsamples
In this sub-section, we discuss the results obtained for the partitions discussed in sub-section II-
B.  Panel A of Table 7 compares the changes in performance for firms privatized before and
after trade liberalization. The gains in profitability, efficiency and output are significantly more
important for firms privatized after trade liberalization.  For example, the mean (median)
improvement in profitability is 9.2 (3.9) percent for firms privatized after trade liberalization
versus 3.5 (0.9) percent for firms privatized before trade liberalization.  The differences are
significant at the 5 percent level for profitability, efficiency and output.  Consequently, our
results suggest that the implementation of trade liberalization prior to privatization is
associated with higher improvements in the performance of NPFs.  This result is consistent with
Dornbusch's (1992) argument that trade liberalization allows a better resource allocation in the
firm and the economy, an easier access to up-to-date technology and inputs, and increased
competition.9
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results for stock market liberalization and shows that
there are significant differences (at the one percent level)  between the performance changes of
firms privatized before and those privatized after  such a liberalization, particularly for
efficiency and output.  Therefore, these results confirm those in Panel A, relative to trade
liberalization.10 We also consider a partition based on the degree of economic freedom that
                                                
9 To further check the robustness of the trade effect on performance changes, we use the trade
restrictiveness index developed by the International Monetary Fund. Given that the index is available only
from 1997 and that our sample period extends from 1980 to 1997, we need to conduct several experiments
using this index. First, we limit the analysis to firms (17) privatized in 1997 and we contrast the changes in
performance of those firms from countries with a relatively high level of trade restrictiveness versus those
from countries with relatively low level of trade restrictiveness. The results, not reported here but
available from the authors upon request, tend to corroborate those presented in Table 7.  Second, since it is
unlikely that the index varies significantly over a period of five years, we include firms privatized in 1995
and 1996 in the sample (40). The results remain qualitatively similar.
10 We also examine the combined effects of trade and stock market liberalizations on the performance of
NPFs. Accordingly, we contrast the performance changes for firms privatized before trade and stockWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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proxies for the extent of government intervention and policy uncertainty in a country.  Panel C
shows that the gains in efficiency and output are significantly higher (at the 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively) for firms privatized in a country with a higher degree of economic freedom.
This result supports the claim that government intervention reduces privately owned firms'
incentives to restructure and to improve performance.
Table 8 examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance
changes of NPFs. In Panel A of Table 8, we contrast the performance changes for firms where
the government relinquishes control (control privatizations) versus those where it  remains a
majority shareholder (revenue privatizations).  The results show that control privatizations
realize higher gains in profitability, efficiency and output than revenue privatizations.  This
evidence is consistent with Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny ‘s (1996) prediction that the lower the
government’s shareholdings, the more likely it is that restructuring will occur and performance
will improve.
As discussed earlier, the involvement of foreign investors in NPFs brings monitoring
and expertise to the firms, which can have an impact on their operating performance.  Hence,
we compare firms with foreign ownership after privatization and firms with no foreign
ownership after privatization.11 The results reported in Panel B show that the gains in
profitability, efficiency and output are more important for the first sub-sample.  For example,
firms with foreign investors achieve an average (median) improvement of 13.1 (8.2) percent in
profitability, 54 (27.7) percent in efficiency and 14.9 (2.7) percent in investment, as well as 44.1
(23.8) percent in output.  For those firms with no foreign ownership, the gains in efficiency and
                                                                                                                                                            
market liberalization versus those privatized after these two reforms. The results, though not reported
here, tend to support the previous findings and show significant differences (at the 1 percent level)
between the two sub-samples for efficiency and output.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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output are less significant.  Their profitability increases insignificantly.  The difference between
both sub-samples is significant at the 1  percent level only for ROS.  Taken together, these
results confirm that the role of the ownership structure (private and foreign) is non negligible in
providing corporate governance functions, especially when legal protections are weak (Dyck,
2000).
As previously discussed in section II-C, we consider a partition based on CEO turnover.
Panel C shows that the performance changes for NPFs with a change in CEO are higher than
those of firms with no CEO turnover.  The CEO turnover sub-sample achieves an improvement
of 8.4 (6.3) percent in profitability compared to 4.2 (1.7) percent for the no-CEO turnover sub-
sample.  The difference between both sub-samples is significant at the 5 percent level.  The
results also indicate a higher increase in efficiency for NPFs with a new appointed CEO after
privatization.12 The Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the difference between sub-samples is
marginally significant (at the 10 percent level).  Hence, our evidence provides some support for
the argument that the CEO turnover, with a new team of managers, increases the probability
that a restructuring occurs in the firm that leads to a better performance (Barberis, Boycko,
Shleifer and Tsukanova, 1996).13
In Panel D, we contrast the performance of NPFs in countries with less effective
governance and those with more effective governance.  We find higher changes in efficiency
and output for NPFs in countries with stronger legal protections and better institutional
                                                                                                                                                            
11 To assess the impact of foreign ownership on post-privatization performance, we exclude firms with
foreign ownership prior to privatization.
12 A survey conducted by La Porta and Lòpez-de-Silanes (1999) also provides evidence that the
introduction of new production processes and the firing of the old management are the two most
important success factors contributing to the postprivatization improvements in the operating efficiency of
NPFs in Mexico.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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environment.  The Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the difference between both sub-samples is
significant at the 1 percent level.  These results suggest that the legal and institutional
environment affects the performance of NPFs in DCs.14  This evidence confirms Ramamurti’s
(2000) and Dyck’s (2001) claim that the level of a country’s institutional development should
contribute to the success of its privatization programs.
                   The results presented in the univariate analysis provide some insight on the role of
economic reforms and conditions as well as corporate governance variables. However,
multivariate regressions can be more insightful because they  take into consideration the role of
these variables jointly.
C. Multivariate Regression Analysis
In Table 9, we report the results of a multivariate regression analysis in which the changes in
profitability, efficiency, investment and output are regressed on three groups of independent
variables, namely the economic reforms and environment variables, the corporate governance
variables, and the firm and industry characteristics.  All four models are estimated
independently with three different specifications each.  These specifications allow us to
                                                                                                                                                            
13 We also examine performance changes for NPFs with high-BOD-turnover versus those with low-BOD-
turnover. The results (not reported here but available upon request) from the Wilcoxon test indicate a
significant increase in profitability, sales efficiency and output for both subsamples.
14 Since the degree of stock market development is directly related to the legal and institutional
environments (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998, 2000), we contrast, as an alternative
partition, firms privatized in low-turnover stock markets versus firms privatized in high-turnover stock
markets.  We employ the ratio of total value of shares traded divided by the average market capitalization
(turnover ratio) as measures of the liquidity of the local stock market. The results suggest important gains
in performance for high-turnover markets. The difference in performance between both groups is highly
significant (at the 1 percent level) for efficiency and output. This evidence is consistent with the argument
that the levels of market development and sophistication play a crucial role in the success of privatization
programs in DCs. The results, based on an alternative measure of stock market development, namely the
ratio of market capitalization (total market capitalization/GDP), are qualitatively similar.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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separately include variables that are highly correlated (for example, legal protection and stock
market development).  Furthermore, since privatization programs could affect some
institutional and stock market development indicators (Boutchkova and Megginson, 2000), thus
creating a certain endogeneity,  we introduce the lagged (pre-privatization) values of these
indictors in our regressions.
C.1 Profitability
Panel A of Table 9 reports the results for the profitability model.  In all three specifications, we
observe a significant (at the 1 percent level) positive relationship between the change in
profitability and the change in GDP growth over the privatization window.  Consistent with
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000), specification (i) indicates a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the change in profitability and stock market
liberalization.  In relation to corporate governance variables, we document a significant positive
relationship between profitability changes and control relinquishment by the government. This
result is consistent with Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who
conclude that privatization typically transfers the control from politicians to private owners
who then show greater interest in profits and efficiency.  Furthermore, specifications (ii) and
(iii) indicate that firms with foreign investors achieve higher profitability gains by 6.3 percent.
This result supports Dyck’s (2000) and Shirley’s (1999) arguments that foreign ownership  can
improve privatization outcomes in DCs where legal protections are weak.  Moreover, small
NPFs show higher profitability changes following privatization, suggesting that relatively
smaller SOEs adapt more easily to a change in the environment.  Finally, we find that
profitability improvement is significantly higher for noncompetitive firms (utilities and
telecommunication).  In sum, the results indicate that variables related to the economic reforms
and environment, the ownership structure, and the legal protection explain at least 23 percent of
the variation in profitability changes.
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C.2 Sales Efficiency
Panel B reports the results for the efficiency model.  Consistent with the results reported in
Table 7, specifications (i) and (iii) indicate a significant positive relationship (at the 1 percent
level) between changes in sales efficiency and stock market and trade liberalization,
respectively.  The positive effect of trade openness is consistent with Dornbusch’s (1992)
argument that trade liberalization leads to a higher competition and a better allocation of
resources.  Interestingly, specification (ii) reports a positive and statistically significant relation
between changes in sales efficiency and the level of economic freedom before privatization.
This evidence suggests that the extent of government intervention in the economy affects the
NPFs’ efficiency.  We also observe a significant (at the 10 percent level) positive relationship
between the change in sales efficiency and the change in GDP growth during the privatization
window (specification (ii)).  The positive effect of GDP growth is no longer significant when we
control for the stock market liberalization and the changes in trade openness (specifications (i)
and (iii)).  This result is consistent with those of Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Bekaert, Harvey
and Lundblad (2001a,b) who find evidence that stock market liberalization and trade openness
are associated with higher economic growth.
Regarding the corporate governance variables, all three specifications show a significant
positive relationship between changes in efficiency and control relinquishment by the
government.  This result is consistent with the often-invoked argument that government’s
control is the source of inefficiency at the firm-level (Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, 1992; Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996).  Interestingly, consistent with D’Souza, Megginson and Nash (2001),
our results show a significant positive relationship between sales efficiency changes and capital
market development (i.e, the turnover ratio).  This result confirms the claim that active capital
markets influence the firms’ performance through its monitoring role.  Several authors argue
that legal protections and institutional development have a positive impact on stock market
development (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 2000).  Therefore, we rerunWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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the tests using a governance index as a proxy for the legal protections and their enforcement by
institutions (specification (iii)). Not surprisingly, the results indicate a significant positive
relationship at the 1 percent level between sales efficiency changes and this proxy.  This could
explain why privatization failed to improve NPFs’ performance in our sample of African and
Middle East countries where weak legal protections and inefficient institutions prevail (see
Table 3a and Figure 3). An implication of this evidence is that legal and institutional reforms
should be encouraged in these countries before launching a privatization program.
Our specifications explain between 15 and 28 percent of the changes in sales efficiency
after privatization.  Overall, our data indicate that economic reforms and the extent of economic
freedom, government control relinquishment and the level of institutional/stock market
development are key determinants of post-privatization efficiency improvements.
C.3 Investment
In Panel C, we present the estimated regression coefficients for the investment model.  Unlike
the profitability and efficiency models, the results for the investment model are surprising, as
few variables help to explain the changes in capital expenditures.  Across the three
specifications, only specification (iii) shows a significant positive relationship between changes
in capital investment expenditures and changes in trade openness, suggesting that trade
liberalization can foster the investment at the firm level. This result is consistent with
Dornbusch’s (1992) argument that trade liberalization increases domestic competition and thus
the incentives for firms to improve their productivity to survive in a highly competitive
environment.  Undoubtedly, this should be achieved through investment.  The regression
results are also consistent with the univariate findings reported in Tables 7 and 8 where
economic reforms and environment and corporate governance variables did not provide any
insights into the determinants of post-privatization investment changes.  These results are not
surprising since NPFs from the African and Middle Eastern region, where economic reforms
had not been fully implemented and where weak legal and institutional environments prevail,William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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actually achieved significant improvements in investment (see Table 6).  D’Souza, Megginson
and Nash (2001) also find no significant variables in their investment model, except for
employment.
C.4 Output
Panel D reports the results for the output model.  Consistent with the univariate analysis, the
results of the regression analysis show that economic reforms and environment as well as
corporate governance variables are important determinants of output changes.  Specifications (i)
and (iii) indicate a positive association between output changes and stock market liberalization
and trade openness, respectively.  This evidence suggests that firms become more productive in
the presence of economic reforms.  Specification (ii) shows that the index of economic freedom
before privatization is a positive and significant determinant of output changes.  This result is
consistent with the prediction that, the  lower the intervention of the government  in the
economy and thus the friendlier the environment, the higher the willingness to increase
production.  In specification (ii), the change in economic growth appears to be positively and
significantly related to output changes after privatization.  However, as discussed for the
efficiency model, once we control for stock market liberalization and trade openness the
variable is no longer significant.
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the regression analysis shows a
significant positive relationship between output changes after privatization and control
relinquishment by the government.  Whatever the specification, this result is robust and the
magnitude of the coefficient associated with the control dummy variable remains stable.  These
results, combined with those discussed with the independent variable index of economic
freedom, suggest that post-privatization output increases are larger with lower government
intervention at the firm-level and the country-level.  Interestingly, stock market development, as
measured by the turnover ratio, has a significant positive impact on output changes suggesting
that firms divested in countries with more developed stock markets become more productive.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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This result supports the claim that more developed stock markets are more efficient monitors.
Finally, specification (iii) indicates a positive and statistically significant relation between
output changes and the level of legal and institutional development.  This evidence suggests
that NPFs in environments where property rights are better protected and enforced become
more productive.
In short, the results indicate that economic reforms and environment and corporate
governance variables are  key determinants of output changes following privatization.  These
variables explain between 7 and 17 percent of the variation in output after divestiture.
D.  Robustness Checks and Econometric Issues
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results by running a  series of experiments.   
Cross-sectional correlation
In order to examine the sources of post-privatization performance changes, we estimated the
equations for the respective change in profitability, efficiency, investment and output
independently.  However, we cannot rule out the possibility that there might be a
contemporaneous correlation between the error terms. For example, a contemporaneous
correlation might arise because (1) we are estimating the change in each performance measure
over the same time period and (2)  the firms in the sample might exhibit certain common
characteristics.  One way to tackle this problem is to estimate the performance equations in a
joint regression, i.e., in a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) system. Although the number
of observations decreases markedly for this joint estimation, the unreported results remain
qualitatively similar to those obtained from an OLS on the same subsample and the full sample
(see Table 9).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Selection Bias
One concern in our analysis is related to a potential selection bias stemming from the possibility
that governments (1) sell firms to insiders , or (2) privatize those firms that are more likely to
achieve performance improvements. The first situation occurs when insider owners who are
about to acquire the firm have an incentive to depress the pre-privatization performance, which
could affect the extent of improvements after divestiture.  In contrast to post-communist
countries, insider privatizations are very rare in DCs. However, we identify the three insider
privatizations in our sample and exclude them from the analyses. Unsurprisingly, the results do
not change.
The second situation stems from the possibility that governments do not randomly select
the firms to be privatized, but rather begin by putting up “better” firms (i.e., those that are more
likely to achieve performance improvements) for sale first.  In such a case, the inferences from
our multivariate analysis might change because certain determinants could be related to the
timing of privatization.  To tackle this problem, we construct an early variable that takes the
value of one if the firm is privatized before the median privatization date in the country, and
zero otherwise. We then re-estimate the specifications reported in Table 9 but the magnitude
and significance of the coefficients remain unchanged.  Moreover, the variable early is
insignificant in 11 out of 12 specifications. Overall, our findings on the performance effects of
privatization and their determinants do not seem to be driven by a selection bias.
Outliers
The presence of outliers could affect our univariate and multivariate results. To address this
concern, we conduct the same tests using a censored (reduced) sample of NPFs that eliminates
the impact of outliers.15 Although not reported here, the univariate and multivariate results are
                                                
15 For each performance measure, the reduced sample is obtained by eliminating observations that are
more than three standard deviations away from the performance mean value. This procedure yields 178
observations for ROS, 181 for ROA, 180 for ROE, 116 for SALEFF, 112 for NIEFF, 134 for CESA, 135 forWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 4 through 8 and in Table 9, respectively. This
would suggest that our inferences are not driven by outliers. We also use regression techniques
that are robust to outliers and we find that our results remain the same, suggesting that outliers
do not drive our regression results.16
IV. Summary and Policy Implications
This is the first multi-national study to investigate the determinants of performance changes for
newly privatized firms in the specific context of developing countries.  First, using a large and
diversified sample of 201 firms, we document a significant increase in both unadjusted and
market-adjusted profitability, efficiency, investment and output.  These results highlight the
superiority of private ownership compared to state ownership and are consistent with the
agency theory which suggests that privatization helps to mitigate agency problems that arise
from the separation of ownership and control in the formerly state-owned enterprises.  Next,
using univariate comparisons and nonparametric tests, we show that changes in performance
vary with the extent of economic liberalization and corporate governance mechanisms.  More
specifically, we show that privatization yields better results when trade and stock market
liberalizations precede it.  This result provides a tentative explanation for the failure of
privatization programs to improve the performance of privatized firms in some developing
countries, particularly those that privatized in a protected environment.
Our multivariate analysis allows us to shed further light on the most important
determinants of performance changes after privatization  Consistent with our predictions,
                                                                                                                                                            
CETA and 180 for SAL. Summary descriptive statistics for the censored sample are available from the
authors upon request.
16  We use the Least Median of Squares (LMS) and Least Trimmed Squares (LTS) subroutines developed
by Rousseeuw  and Leroy (1987).William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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economic reforms and conditions as well as corporate governance variables appear to drive the
performance improvements of newly-privatized firms in developing countries. In brief, our
results show that control relinquishment by the government and the extent of foreign
ownership are important determinants of performance changes. Legal protection and the extent
of government intervention in the economy (as proxied by the Economic Freedom Index), are
also positively related to performance improvements. Finally, trade and stock market
liberalization as well as the level of economic freedom have a positive impact on investment
improvements suggesting that economic reforms create favorable conditions and the necessary
incentives for NPFs to make the investments they need to improve their efficiency and
profitability. The success of privatization is further enhanced  by an adequate institutional
environment that insures the protection of property rights and law enforcement. In countries
where legal protection is weak, performance gains can only be modest as illustrated by the
privatization experience of African countries.
As academicians and policy makers have recently suggested, there is a need to reform the legal
systems in developing countries and make them stronger and more efficient in order to reduce
the contractual uncertainty in transactions between firms and improve incentives  for both
domestic and foreign firms to invest. Foreign investors, in particular, appear to be instrumental
in stimulating the positive change in the performance of newly privatized firms.
Hence, attempts to privatize in the absence of an effective institutional framework are
likely to fail as witnessed by the experience of African countries. The experience of our sample
shows that, in order to ensure positive privatization outcomes, stock market and trade
liberalizations should take place before privatization is implemented. Indeed, trade
liberalization will lead to greater competition and a better allocation of resources while stock
market liberalization will bring technological innovation and progress as well as new physical
and human capital through the involvement of foreign investors. All these economic changes
will create an environment that provides firms with the necessary incentives to invest andWilliam Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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restructure in order to face the competition of their private peers. What is more, when
privatization follows liberalization (and other significant changes in the economic setting), it
reduces the risk of reversibility of the privatization policy.
In summary, the main policy implications of our results are as follows. First,
governments should implement economic reforms (trade and stock market liberalization)
before privatization.  Liberalization creates a favorable environment for business and helps to
attract foreign investors who are major providers of new funds and technology to the privatized
firms.  Second, although external corporate governance mechanisms are still weak in
developing countries (namely, markets for corporate control and for managers), stock market
development contributes by addressing agency problems and improves resource allocation.  For
the market to play an active role in better resource allocation, governments in developing
countries should ensure a better legal protection for minority shareholders and improve the
institutional setting to attract foreign investors.  Our results add to the growing empirical
evidence that supports the role of the legal protection of investors and enforcement by
institutions in explaining cross-country and cross-firm differences in performance.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 1
Description of the Sample of Newly Privatized Firms in Developing Countries
This table provides some descriptive statistics for the sample of the 201 privatized firms used in this study.  We report the
distribution of privatizations in the countries included in the sample by year, industry, legal origin and region.
Distribution of Privatizations
By Year By Industry
Year Number Percentage Industry Number Percentage
1980 1 0.50 Financial 66 32.84
1981 1 0.50 Utilities 22 10.95
1983 1 0.50 Telecommunication 14 6.97
1985 4 1.99 Energy 54 26.87
1986 5 2.49 Other 45 22.39
1987 3 1.49 Total 201 100
1988 4 1.99 By Legal Origin
1989 25 12.44 Category (countries) Number Percentage
1990 21 10.45 Common law countries (10) 65 32.34
1991 34 16.92 French civil law countries (20) 131 65.17
1992 30 14.93 German civil law countries (2) 5 2.49
1993 11 5.47 Total (32) 201 100
1994 17 8.46 By Region *
1995 9 4.48 Region (countries) Number Percentage
1996 15 7.46 Africa and the Middle East (10) 49 24.38
1997 20 9.95 East and South Asia and the Pacific (10) 50 24.88
Latin America and the Caribbean (9) 67 33.33
Europe and Central Asia (3) 35 17.41
Total 201 100 Total (32) 201 100
* World Bank country group classifications.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 2
Summary of the Variables
This table describes the variables used in the regression analysis to investigate the determinants of post-privatization performance
changes.
Variables Definition
Operating Performance
DROS Change in return on sales during the privatization window (-3,-1 versus +1, +3).
DSALEFF Change in  sales efficiency during the privatization window (-3,-1 versus +1, +3).
DCESA Change in  capital expenditures during the privatization window (-3,-1 versus +1, +3).
DSAL Change in  real sales during the privatization window (-3,-1 versus +1, +3).
Economic Reforms and Environment
∆  GDP Change of GDP growth rate over the privatization window (-3,-1 versus +1, +3).
Liber Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the privatization occurs after the stock market
liberalization and 0 otherwise.
∆  Trade Change of the sum of exports and imports over GDP during the privatization window (-3,-1 versus
+1, +3).
Free The value of the economic freedom index before privatization.
Corporate Governance
Control Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the government relinquishes control of the privatized
firm and 0 otherwise.
Foreign Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if foreign investors are involved for the first time in the
ownership structure of the privatized firm and 0 otherwise.
Law Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for firms from common law countries and 0 otherwise.
Turn Measure of stock market liquidity before privatization.
Governance Measure of the extent of legal protections and enforcement before privatization that comprises 3
components: rule of law, risk of confiscation and risk of contract repudiation by the government.
Control Variables
Size The natural logarithm of total sales at the time of privatization.
Industry Indicators Indicator variables included for 4 of the 5 industries defined in Table 1.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 3a
Descriptive Data on the Sample Countries
This table provides some descriptive statistics on the macroeconomic and corporate governance variables for the sample of 32 countries.  Details on the variables are
presented below the table.
Panel A: Country-Level Macroeconomic Variables
Panel B: Country-Level
Corporate Governance Variables
Country
Index of
Economic
Freedom
Mean 1980-97
Stock Market
Liberalization
Date
Foreign Direct
Investment/GDP
Mean 1980-99
Trade
Liberalization
Date
Trade/GDP
Mean 1980-99
GDP Growth
(annual %)
Mean 1980-99
Stock Market
Turnover
Mean 1980-97
Governance
Index
Mean 1980-97
Bangladesh 3.86 NL 0.07 NL** 23.11 4.56 33.76 3.60
Ghana 4.40 1994 0.74 1985 43.58 3.13 2.98 4.98
India 4.66 1992 0.22 1994 18.88 5.79 49.06 5.98
Malaysia 7.44 1988 4.36 Always open 145.06 6.54 30.56 7.28
Nigeria 3.68 1995 2.88 NL* 60.80 1.99 0.99 3.44
Pakistan 4.60 1991 0.61 NL * 36.53 5.44 24.77 4.36
Singapore 8.86  Before 1969 9.67 Always open 370.44 7.54 40.27 9.18
Africa (South) 6.28 1992 0.31 1991 48.06 1.79 12.48 6.18
Thailand 6.90 1987 1.78 Always open 70.69 6.26 61.57 7.30
Trinidad 5.98 NL 4.75 NL * 80.78 1.64 1.76 5.80
English Origin Average 5.67 N.A. 2.54 N.A. 89.79 4.47 25.82 5.81
Argentina 5.96 1989 1.58 1991 16.96 1.91 28.84 5.88
Brazil 4.60 1991 1.08 1991 17.89 2.40 45.47 6.78
Chile 7.14 1992 3.23 1976 55.95 5.41 7.41 7.08
Colombia 5.38 1991 1.70 1991 31.91 3.12 9.15 4.40
Cote D’Ivoire 5.22 NL 1.04 NL** 71.39 1.30 2.17 4.95
Egypt 5.12 1997 1.96 NL 54.22 5.20 28.78 5.28
Greece 6.24 1987 1.08 1959 44.24 1.94 17.61 6.78
Indonesia 6.48 1989 0.71 1970 52.40 5.59 30.59 5.60
Jamaica 5.92 NL 2.08 1988 107.76 1.09 7.13 5.64
Jordan 5.76 1995 1.07 1965 121.18 4.43 14.96 4.52
Mexico 6.18 1989 1.58 1986 39.20 2.82 51.48 6.84
Morocco 5.06 1997 0.56 1984 55.76 3.25 20.65 5.20
Peru 4.96 N.A. 1.53 1991 32.32 1.82 29.95 4.72
Philippines 6.24 1991 1.14 1988 66.58 2.38 27.16 4.22William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 3a -- Continued
Panel A: Country-Level Macroeconomic Variables
Panel B: Country-Level
Corporate Governance Variables
Country
Index of
Economic
Freedom
Mean 1980-97
Stock Market
Liberalization
Date
Foreign Direct
Investment/GDP
Mean 1980-99
Trade
Liberalization
Date
Trade/GDP
Mean 1980-98
GDP Growth
(annual %)
Mean 1980-99
Stock Market
Turnover
Mean 1980-97
Legal and
Institutional
Index
Mean 1980-97
Portugal 6.70 1986 1.54 1960 66.61 2.99 40.70 8.78
Senegal 4.76 N.A. 0.65 NL** 67.72 2.88 N.A. 3.06
Togo 4.90 N.L. 1.01 NL* 84.60 2.14 N.A. 4.12
Tunisia 5.18 NL 1.96 1989 84.54 4.33 1.45 5.16
Turkey 5.16 1989 0.33 1989 35.78 4.04 67.08 5.50
Venezuela 5.80 1990 1.38 1990 48.20 1.07 15.76 5.68
French Origin Average 5.64 N.A. 1.36 N.A. 57.76 3.01 24.80 5.51
Korea (S) 6.66 1992 0.47 1968 67.10 7.06 96.17 7.22
Taiwan 7.28 1991 N.A. 1963 N.A. N.A. N.A 8.64
German Origin Average 6.97 N.A. 0.47 N.A. 66.51 7.06 96.17 7.93
Developed Countries
Japan 7.98 1980 0.04 1962 21.25 2.72 39.75 9.28
United Kingdom 8.26 Before 1969 2.13 1959 52.74 2.19 47.925 9.14
United States 8.76 Before 1969 0.95 1950 20.44 2.99 83.775 9.62
Source:
Gwartney,
Lawson and
Samida (2000)
Source: Bekaert,
Harvey and
Lundblad
(2001a) and
Henry (2000)
Source: World
Development
Indicators (2001)
Source: Sachs
and Warner
(1995) and IMF
Country
Reports
Source: World
Development
Indicators
(2001)
Source: World
Development
Indicators (2001)
Source: World
Development
Indicators
(2001)
Source: Gwartney,
Lawson and
Samida (2000)
* Not liberalized by 1992.
** Not liberalized by 1997.
Index of economic freedom.  Data are from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000).  The index is a range of objective components that reflect the presence
(or absence) of economic freedom and comprises 23 components designed to identify how consistent institutional arrangements and policies in seven
major areas are with economic freedom.  These areas are: (1) size of the government, (2) economic structure and use of markets, (3) monetary policy and
price stability, (4) freedom to use alternative currencies, (5) legal structure and security of private ownership, (6) freedom to trade with foreigners, and (7)
freedom to exchange in capital markets.  Scale from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher levels of economic freedom.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 3a -- Continued
Stock market liberalization date.  Data are from Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2001a).  The liberalization date for Taiwan is from Bekaert and Harvey
(2000).  NL indicates that the stock market is not liberalized.  Missing countries are : Peru and Senegal.
Trade liberalization date.  Data are from Sachs and Warner (1995) and IMF Country Reports.
Trade/GDP.  The ratio is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by gross domestic product (GDP hereafter).  Data are from the
World Development Indicators (2001) CD-ROM and are available from 1980 to 1999.
GDP growth.  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.  Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S.
dollars.  Data are from the World Development Indicators (2001) CD-ROM and are available from 1980 to 1999.
Stock market turnover.  Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the period.  Data are from the
World Development Indicators (2001) CD-ROM and are available from 1980 to 1999.
Governance index.  The index focuses on the legal structure and the security of property rights and the enforcement of contracts.  It comprises the
following three components: (1) rule of law (countries with legal institutions that were more supportive of rule of law received higher ratings), (2) risk of
expropriation (countries with less risk of confiscation received higher ratings), and (3) risk of contract repudiation (countries where there is less risk that
government will unilaterally cancel contracts received higher ratings).  Data are from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000) and are available from 1980
to 1997.  All components of the index are from the International Country Risk Guide.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 3b
Firm Characteristics
This table presents summary statistics on the government and foreign ownership after privatization for a subsample of 192 firms privatized between 1980 and
1997.  It also reports the post-privatization size of the firms as measured by the natural logarithm of sales.  The post-privatization data come mainly from annual
reports and offering prospectus.  All statistics are presented as a percentage.
Post-Privatization
Government Ownership (%)
Post-Privatization Foreign
Ownership (%)
Size (natural logarithm of
sales)
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Legal Origin
Common Law 63 32.49 30 61 14.09 6.00 63 11.23 11.39
Civil Law 119 24.52 5 90 18.29 4.40 129 12.25 12.61
Region
Africa and the Middle East 45 21.14 13.14 44 19.86 7.04 44 10 10.12
Latin America and the Caribbean 61 13.27 0 39 26.12 9 64 12.74 12.95
East and South Asia and the Pacific 47 52.32 65 45 9.95 6.83 49 12.83 12.99
Europe and Central Asia 29 24.79 13.20 23 7.20 0 35 11.57 12.28
Industry
Financial 63 14.26 0 50 22.13 9.17 66 11.30 12.11
Utilities 22 37.14 40.27 17 19.81 7.90 22 12.23 13.35
Telecommunication 14 37.13 41.35 11 30.63 33 12 13.61 13.59
Energy 46 36.99 30.50 39 11.82 2 52 12.23 12.16
Other 36 28.99 24.53 32 8.29 0.15 40 11.84 12.26William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 4
Summary of Results for the Sample of All Privatized Firms: 1980-1997
This table presents the univariate results for the complete sample of privatized firms in developing countries for the period 1980-1997.  The measures of
operating performance are return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), sales efficiency (SALEFF), net income efficiency (NIEFF),
capital expenditures divided by sales  (CESA), capital expenditures divided by total assets  (CETA) and real sales (SAL).  For each performance measure, it
provides the mean and the median values for the three-year period before and after privatization.  Column 5 presents the change in the mean and median
values of the performance indicators after versus before privatization.  Column 6 provides the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians.  The two
remaining columns provide the proportion of firms whose performance changed as predicted and the significance test of this change.  *, **, *** denote
significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Variables N
Mean
(Median)
Before
Mean
(Median)
After
Mean
(Median)
Change
Z-Statistic for
Difference in
Medians
(After-Before)
Proportion of
Firms that
Behaved as
Predicted
Z-Statistic for
Significance of
Proportion
Change
Profitability
0.073 0.149 0.077
Return on Sales (ROS) 196
(0.049) (0.090) (0.023)
4.08* 0.61 3.22*
0.044 0.057 0.012
Return on Assets (ROA) 199
(0.024) (0.039) (0.010)
2.98* 0.62 3.57*
0.166 0.204 0.038
Return on Equity (ROE) 198
(0.102) (0.140) (0.023)
2.56* 0.59 2.45**
Efficiency
0.967 1.319 0.352
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) 127
(0.932) (1.115) (0.197)
7.04* 0.74 6.15*
0.879 1.406 0.527
Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) 123
(0.791) (1.216) (0.357)
4.39* 0.65 3.48*
Investment
0.122 0.213 0.091
Capital Expenditures to Sales (CESA) 149
(0.042) (0.095) (0.022)
4.00* 0.72 5.90*
0.056 0.083 0.027
Capital Expenditures to Total Assets (CETA) 149
(0.013) (0.048) (0.011)
3.62* 0.68 4.83*
Output
1.147 1.294 0.147
Real Sales (SAL) 198
(0.939) (1.128) (0.159)
6.64* 0.72 6.77*
Employment
11396 11280 -116
Total Number of Employees (EMPL) 128
(3545) (3765) (9)
-0.09 0.53 0.71William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 5
Summary of Market-Adjusted and Unadjusted Results for the Sample of Market-Adjusted Firms
This table presents both unadjusted and adjusted results  for the sample of firms for which we could compute market-adjusted accounting performance
measures.  Market-adjusted performance measures are obtained by subtracting the market median performance measure from the firm’s performance
measure.  The measures of operating performance are return on sales (ROS), sales efficiency (SALEFF), capital expenditures divided by sales  (CESA) and
real sales (SAL).  For each performance measure, the mean and the median values are computed over a window of -3,-1 and +1,+3 years around the
privatization year.  Column 5 presents the change in the mean and median values of performance indicators after versus before privatization.  Column 6
provides the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians.  The two remaining columns provide the proportion of firms whose performance
changed as predicted and the significance test of this change.  *, **, *** denote significance levels of  1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Variables N
Mean
(Median)
Before
Mean
(Median)
After
Mean
(Median)
Change
Z-Statistic for
Difference in
Medians
(After-Before)
Proportion of Firms
that Behaved as
Predicted
Z-Statistic for
Significance of
Proportion Change
Return on Sales
0.045 0.147 0.102
Unadjusted 110
(0.042) (0.085) (0.025)
3.60* 0.64 2.96*
-0.066 0.083 0.149
Adjusted 110
(-0.018) (0.040) (0.047)
4.08* 0.65 3.39*
Sales Efficiency
0.944 1.402 0.457
Unadjusted 66
(0.908) (1.157) (0.263)
5.83* 0.79 5.68*
-0.092 0.398 0.490
Adjusted 66
(-0.083) (0.175) (0.208)
4.34* 0.70 3.46*
Capital Expenditures to Sales
0.188 0.232 0.044
Unadjusted 69
(0.079) (0.116) (0.017)
1.92** 0.67 2.92*
0.149 0.192 0.043
Adjusted 69
(0.039) (0.068) (0.013)
1.83*** 0.61 1.84***
Real Sales
1.272 1.314 0.042
Unadjusted 100
(0.921) (1.128) (0.185)
5.67* 0.74 5.44*
0.256 0.342 0.087
Adjusted 100
(-0.012) (0.107) (0.122)
3.93* 0.59 1.82***William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 6
Performance Changes of Newly Privatized Firms by Geographical Region
This table reports the changes in performance for the sample of 201 privatized firms classified in four geographical regions according to the four
World Bank country group classifications: (1) Africa and the Middle East,  (2) East and South Asia and the Pacific, (3) Latin America and the
Caribbean and (4) Europe and Central Asia.  The measures of operating performance are return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), return on
equity (ROE), sales efficiency (SALEFF), net income efficiency (NIEFF), capital expenditures divided by sales  (CESA), capital expenditures
divided by total assets  (CETA) and real sales (SAL).  For each performance measure, the table provides the change in the mean and median
values, the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians and the number of observations.  It also presents the p-value of the multi-sample non
parametric Savage test for the difference between the four regions.  *, **, *** denote significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Performance Profitability Efficiency Investment Output
Region ROS ROA ROE SALEFF NIEFF CESA CETA SAL
Africa and the Middle East
Mean change 0.033 0.013 0.032 -0.003 -1.176 0.117 0.053 0.013
Median change 0.009 0.010 0.017 -0.024 -0.088 0.033 0.017 0.020
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 1.15 1.04 1.02 0.07 0.20 2.91* 3.05* 0.33
N 46 48 47 11 11 42 44 48
East and South Asia and the Pacific
Mean change 0.064 0.019 0.018 0.367 0.797 0.169 0.041 0.528
Median change 0.024 0.011 0.025 0.176 0.521 0.022 0.019 0.179
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 2.41** 2.05** 1.44 3.86* 4.00* 1.84*** 1.66*** 6.07*
N 50 49 50 41 41 40 38 50
Latin America and the Caribbean
Mean change 0.108 0.034 0.093 0.485 0.760 0.009 0.003 0.324
Median change 0.077 0.013 0.077 0.362 0.478 0.027 0.011 0.294
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 3.55* 3.44* 3.12* 5.27* 3.28* 2.25** 2.13** 4.59
N 66 67 67 48 46 53 53 65
Europe and Central Asia
Mean change 0.090 -0.044 -0.037 0.137 -0.257 0.075 -0.004 -0.002
Median change 0.001 -0.003 -0.032 0.229 -0.136 -0.005 -0.002 0.138
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 0.09 -0.76 -0.69 2.41** -0.81 0.15 -0.67 2.93*
N 34 35 34 21 21 13 13 34
P-value Savage test (difference
between regions)
0.00* 0.09*** 0.05** 0.01* 0.09*** 0.74 0.11 0.00*William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 7
Comparison of Performance Changes: The Role of Economic Reforms and Environment
This table presents comparisons between the operating performance changes of several partitions of privatized
firms based on economic reforms and environment variables.  The measures of operating performance are
return on sales (ROS), sales efficiency (SALEFF), capital expenditures divided by sales (CESA), and real sales
(SAL).  Panel A compares the performance changes of firms privatized before trade liberalization (BTL) versus
those privatized after trade liberalization (ATL).  The effective trade liberalization dates are from Sachs and
Warner (1995).  Panel B compares the performance changes of firms privatized before stock market
liberalization (BSL) versus those privatized after stock market liberalization (ASL).  Panel C compares the
performance changes of privatized firms in countries with low economic freedom (LEF) versus those from
countries with high economic freedom (HEF).  The index is from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000) and
covers the period 1980-1997.  For each performance measure, the table provides the change in the mean and
median values, the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians and the number of observations.  It also
presents the p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the difference between the two subsamples.  *, **, *** denote
significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Measures of Operating Performance ROS SALEFF CESA SAL
Panel A.  Performance Changes for Privatized Firms before versus after Trade Liberalization
BTL
Mean change 0.035 0.120 0.092 0.092
Median change 0.009 0.128 0.019 0.059
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 1.51 2.33** 3.07* 1.88***
N 5 12 94 35 3
ATL
Mean change 0.092 0.443 0.093 0.315
Median change 0.039 0.271 0.031 0.215
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 3.61* 6.71* 2.86* 6.95*
N 138 93 102 137
P-value Kruskal-Wallis test for
difference between subsamples
0.03** 0.01* 0.59 0.02**
Panel B.  Performance Changes for Privatized Firms before versus after Stock Market Liberalization
BSL
Mean change 0.046 0.094 0.088 0.082
Median change 0.021 0.104 0.028 0.079
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 2.05** 1.85*** 3.51* 1.95**
N 7 63 76 67 8
ASL
Mean change 0.096 0.461 0.090 0.353
Median change 0.021 0.271 0.017 0.229
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 2.97 6.70 1.84 6.79
N 110 84 74 109
P-value Kruskal-Wallis test for
difference between Subsamples
0.44 0.00* 0.64 0.00*William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 7 -- Continued
Measures of Operating Performance ROS SALEFF CESA SAL
Panel C.  Performance Changes for Privatized Firms in Countries with Low versus High Economic Freedom
LEF
Mean change 0.081 0.244 0.052 0.030
Median change 0.033 0.162 0.018 0.092
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 2.91* 3.58* 3.00* 2.71*
N 116 63 86 117
HEF
Mean change 0.071 0.458 0.144 0.555
Median change 0.019 0.270 0.029 0.294
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 2.77* 6.33* 2.61* 7.72*
N 8 06 46 38 0
P-value Kruskal-Wallis test for
difference between subsamples
0.71 0.03** 0.53 0.00*William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 8
Comparison of Performance Changes: The Role of Corporate Governance
This table presents comparisons between the operating performance changes of several partitions of privatized
firms based on corporate governance variables.  The measures of operating performance are return on sales
(ROS), sales efficiency (SALEFF), capital expenditures divided by sales (CESA), and real sales (SAL).  Panel A
compares the performance changes of control privatization (more than 50 % of the company is privatized) and
revenue privatization (less than 50% of the company is privatized).  Panel B compares the performance changes
of privatized firms without foreign ownership (NFO) or with foreign ownership after privatization (FO).  Panel
C compares the performance changes for privatized firms with a new CEO during the privatization process
versus privatized firms with the same CEO.  Panel D compares the performance changes for privatized firms in
countries with low governance index (LGI) versus high governance index (HGI).  The index is from Gwartney,
Lawson and Samida (2000) and covers the period 1980-1997.  For each performance measure, it provides the
change in mean and median values, the Wilcoxon Z statistic for the difference in medians and the number of
observations.  It also presents the p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test for the difference between the two
subsamples.  *, **, *** denote significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Measures of Operating Performance ROS SALEFF CESA SAL
Panel A.  Performance Changes for Revenue versus Control Privatization
Control
Mean  change 0.128 0.596 0.115 0.464
Median change 0.069 0.363 0.020 0.277
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 4.04* 5.94* 3.13* 5.62*
N8 5 5 9 70 85
Revenue
Mean change 0.030 0.142 0.046 0.200
Median change 0.011 0.088 0.063 0.113
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 1.80*** 3.35* 1.82*** 4.76*
N6 9 5 2 49 69
P-value Kruskal-Wallis Test for
Difference between Subsamples
0.00* 0.00* 0.44 0.04**
Panel B.  Performance Changes for Privatized Firms with or without Foreign Ownership
NFO
Mean change 0.056 0.277 0.078 0.189
Median change 0.004 0.191 0.029 0.183
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 0.88 3.74* 3.13* 3.93*
N 8 04 76 18 0
FO
Mean change 0.131 0.540 0.149 0.441
Median change 0.082 0.277 0.027 0.238
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 4.44* 5.79* 2.52* 6.30*
N 7 15 45 57 1
P-value Kruskal-Wallis test for
difference between subsamples
0.00* 0.13 0.68 0.16William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 8 -- Continued
Measures of Operating Performance ROS SALEFF CESA SAL
Panel C.  Performance Changes for Privatized Firms with or without CEO Change
Same CEO
Mean  change 0.042 0.183 0.148 0.092
Median change 0.017 0.162 0.042 0.065
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 1.28 2.90* 3.16* 2.54*
N4 7 3 3 43 48
New CEO
Mean  change 0.084 0.365 0.170 0.168
Median change 0.063 0.231 0.013 0.136
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 3.07* 3.98* 1.65*** 2.50*
N3 4 2 6 25 34
P-value Kruskal-Wallis test for
difference between subsamples
0.05** 0.10*** 0.16 0.62
Panel D.  Performance Changes for Privatized Firms in Countries with Less versus High Governance Index
LGI
Mean  change 0.081 0.213 0.122 0.036
Median change 0.036 0.129 0.039 0.075
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 2.34** 2.40** 3.82* 2.52*
N8 8 4 3 67 90
HGI
Mean  change 0.069 0.436 0.110 0.447
Median change 0.019 0.271 0.019 0.229
Z-stat Wilcoxon test 3.47* 7.19* 2.51* 7.75*
N 105 83 79 105
P-value Kruskal-Wallis test for
difference between subsamples
0.83 0.01* 0.15 0.00*William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 9
Coefficient Estimates from Regressions of Performance Changes of Privatized Firms on Economic Reforms and Environment and Corporate
Governance Variables
This table presents the results from regressions conducted to determine the sources of performance changes of privatized firms in developing countries over the
period 1980-1997.  The dependent variables in the four Panels are change in return on sales (DROS), change in sales efficiency (DSALEFF), change in capital
expenditures (DCESA) and change in real sales (DSAL), respectively.  The change in each of the dependent variables is computed by substracting the three-year-
pre-privatization average from the three-year-post-privatization average.  The independent variables are related to economic reforms and environment and to
corporate governance. They are described as follows: ∆ GDP is the change of GDP growth during the privatization window (-3,-1 and +1,+3); Liber takes the
value of 1 if the privatization occurs after the stock market liberalization; ∆ Trade is the change of the sum of exports and imports over GDP during the
privatization window (-3,-1 and +1,+3); Free is the value of the index of economic freedom before privatization; Control takes the value of 1 if the government
relinquishes control of the privatized firm; Foreign equals 1 if foreign investors are involved in the ownership structure of the privatized firm; Law equals 1 for
firms from common law countries; Governance is a measure of the extent of legal protections and law enforcement; Turn is the three-year-pre-privatization
average turnover and measures the liquidity of the stock market.  Size is the natural logarithm of total sales at the time of privatization.  We include industry
indicators in all specifications.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics using White’s (1980) procedure are reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance
levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Economic Reforms and
Environment
Corporate Governance Control
Const ∆ GDP Liber ∆ Trade Free Control Foreign Law 100*Turn Governance Size Industry Adj-R2 N F-test
Panel A.  DROS
(i) 0.097 0.006* 0.050** -0.039 0.110* 0.066 0.024 -0.013 Included 0.24 140 5.03*
(0.64) (4.13) (2.23) (0.45) (4.44) (1.31) (0.24) (1.26)
(ii) 0.075 0.005* 0.002 0.115* 0.063** 0.031 -0.012 Included 0.23 121 4.65*
(0.67) (3.33) (0.14) (4.16) (2.01) (0.26) (1.06)
(iii) -0.006 0.005* 0.047 0.115* 0.063*** 0.006 -0.011 Included 0.23 121 4.67*
(0.10) (3.17) (0.48) (4.16) (1.90) (0.69) (1.15)
Panel B.  DSALEFF
(i) -0.781 0.017 0.447* 0.766 0.458* 0.089 1.296** -0.074 Included 0.28 102 4.65*
(0.75) (1.42) (3.17 (1.28) (3.55) (0.30) (2.01) (1.14)
(ii) -0.510 0.021*** 0.156* 0.396* 0.115 1.513** -0.078 Included 0.27 91 4.29*
(0.99) (1.72) (2.58) (2.71) (0.81) (2.07) (1.29)
(iii) -1.799** 0.011 1.152* 0.478* 0.102 0.146* -0.044 Included 0.15 91 2.60*
(2.10) (0.84) (2.79) (3.16) (0.62) (3.74) (0.78)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Table 9 – Continued
Economic Reforms and
Environment
Corporate Governance Control
Const ∆ GDP Liber ∆ Trade Free Control Foreign Law 100*Turn Governance Size Industry Adj-R2 N F-test
Panel C.  DCESA
(i) -0.112 -0.001 0.082 0.195 0.108 0.105 -0.067 -0.005 Included 0.00 109 1.00
(0.26) (0.48) (0.64) (1.15) (1.31) (1.00) (0.48) (0.22)
(ii) -0.207 -0.001 0.093 0.155 0.054 -0.120 -0.015 Included 0.05 96 1.55
(1.05) (0.82) ((1.49) (1.30) (0.65) (0.88) (0.58)
(iii) -0.519 -0.004 0.394*** 0.152 0.091 0.053 -0.012 Included 0.02 96 1.16
(1.57) (1.13) (1.85) (1.29) (0.82) (1.44) (0.55)
Panel D.  DSAL
(i) -0.109 0.004 0.315* 0.358 0.338* 0.258 1.245*** -0.075 Included 0.17 140 3.58*
(0.10) (0.91) (2.51) (0.73) (2.81) (0.74) (1.80) (1.05)
(ii) -0.162 0.007 0.157* 0.358* -0.008 1.266*** -0.084 Included 0.17 122 3.40*
(0.28) (1.66) (3.17) (2.99) (0.10) (1.65) (1.15)
(iii) -1.431 -0.003 1.053* 0.348* 0.074 0.139* -0.047 Included 0.08 122 1.98**
(0.20) (0.47) (3.84) (3.11) (0.45) (4.17) (0.72)William Davidson Institute Working Paper 419
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Figure 1.  Economic Freedom by Geographical Region (1980-97)
The figure presents the mean level of the economic freedom index over the period 1980-1997 for the
four geographical regions included in our sample.  The classification of geographical regions follows
the World Bank country group classification.  Data are from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000).
The index is a range of objective components that reflect the presence (or absence) of economic
freedom. The scale is from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher levels of economic freedom.
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Figure 2.  Trade Restrictiveness Index by Geographical Region (1997)
The figure reports the 1997 value of the trade restrictiveness developed by the International
Monetary Fund for the four geographical regions included in our sample.  The classification of
geographical regions follows the World Bank country group classification.  Higher index scores
imply more trade restrictiveness.
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Figure 3.  Governance Index by Geographical Region (1980-97)
The figure reports the average scores of the governance index over the period 1980-1997 for the
four geographical regions included in our sample.  The classification of geographical regions
follows the World Bank country group classification. Data are from Gwartney, Lawson and
Samida (2000).  The index focuses on the legal structure and the security of property rights and
the enforcement of contracts.  The scale is from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher
levels of legal protection and law enforcement.
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Figure 4.  Stock Market Liquidity by Geographical Region (1980-97)
The figure depicts  the level of stock market liquidity measured by the average turnover ratio
over the period 1980-97 for the four geographical regions included in our sample. The
classification of geographical regions follows the World Bank country group classification. Data
are from the World Development Indicators (2001) CD-ROM.
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